In this paper we explored three areas: decision making and information seeking, the relationship between information seeking and uncertainty, and the role of expertise in influencing information use. This was undertaken in the context of a qualitative study into decision making in the initial stages of emergency response to major incidents. The research took an interpretive approach in which activity theory is used as an analytical framework. The research provides further evidence that the context of the activity and individual differences influence the choice of decision mode and associated information behavior. We also established that information is often not used to resolve uncertainty in decision making and indeed information is often sought and used after the decision is made to justify the decision. Finally, we point to the significance of both expertise and confidence in understanding information behavior. The contribution of the research to existing theoretical frameworks is discussed and a modified version of Wilson's problemsolving model is proposed.
Introduction
The context in which information behavior (IB) takes place is of growing interest to information researchers because it is felt to significantly influence individual information behavior (Fisher, Landry, & Naumer, 2007) . It, has, however, been argued that researchers have tended to focus on groups or individuals who work within a similar sociocultural context using similar technological artifacts to mediate their behavior: students, scholars, and professionals (Bawden & Robinson, 2013; Julien, Peckoskie, & Reid, 2011) . Equally, the work tasks that have been explored in this environment tended to be relatively simple and not time pressured. Generalization of findings from research undertaken within this context into other environments can be regarded as problematic (Wilson, 2008) . A body of work, however, has emerged during the past decade that explores information behavior in alternative contexts (Byström & Hansen, 2005; Byström & Järvelin, 1995; Ellis & Haugan, 1997) , particularly work environments. A key question for these researchers is the following: When we study information behavior in work environments can we generate new knowledge which extends, challenges, or refutes existing IB models and assumptions?
In this paper we explore this question in relation to three areas: decision making and information seeking, the relationship between information seeking and uncertainty, the role of expertise in influencing information use. We do this by focusing on a context where tasks are dynamic, complex, uncertain, and time pressured: the initial stages of emergency response to major incidents or disasters. This provides an environment for study where individuals are involved in particularly information-intensive activities (Folb, Detlefsen, Quinn, Barron, & Trauth, 2010) and is also one in which fully understanding information behavior has proved to be an intractable problem.
This paper proceeds as follows: in the next section, literature on information behavior in relation to decision making, expertise, and uncertainty is reviewed. This is followed by a description of the method used in this research project, highlighting activity theory as an analytical framework. The Findings and Discussion section illuminates the following research questions: Are decision modes that do not conform to traditional IB approaches used? Does expertise moderate information seeking and decision making? Is information sought and used primarily to resolve uncertainty? This is then followed by a Conclusion section that highlights the key findings from the research.
Literature Review
The purpose of this literature review is threefold: provide a brief review of decision making, highlighting the models used within IB research; review relevant literature related to the influence of expertise; explore the issue of information use and uncertainty.
Modes of Decision Making
Berryman (2008, p. 196) notes that information research has relied upon "rational decision theory" to understand human decision making which assumes that effective decision making is preceded by and inextricably linked to the seeking and use of information (cf. Allen, 2011) to make reflective, evidence-based decisions. However, Berryman was also one of the first IB researchers to identify new developments in decision science pointing to naturalistic decision making (NDM) as an alternative model. Klein (2008) and colleagues (Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 2003) developed the NDM model indicating that, in contrast to the rational decision model, experts made high-quality decisions drawing on a holistic process involving situation recognition and pattern matching to memory structures to make rapid choices (Endsley, 1997) . Few researchers have heeded Berryman's (2008) suggestion that information behavior researchers incorporate NDM models in their research. One of the few information science studies to utilize NDM was Booth (2008, 2011) in their analysis of decision making and information use in the health sector. They noted that when information was absent ". . . participants satisficed. They . . . made decisions recognizing that they did not have all of the information they needed" (MacDonald et al., 2008, p. 31) .
Although information behavior research has focused primarily on rational models, research in decision making has focused on both rational models and other alternatives and the relationship between the different models (the dual processing debate). Within this debate, two approaches, reflecting different modes of thinking, have been identified as driving decision making. These have been labeled in differing ways as experiential and rational, intuitive and deliberative, reflexive and reflective, intuitive and analytic, System 1 and System 2 (Evans, 2008) , and Type 1 and Type 2 (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2011) . Although the labels vary, the sets of terms share the same broad characteristics. The first set of terms refers to decisions that draw on instinctive knowing such as a "hunch" or "gut feeling" (Hammond, 2010) or tacit knowledge and where information is processed in a "nonconscious holistic" manner (Sinclair, 2010, p. 378) . In this mode of decision making, incoming information or other cues are used to recognize and retrieve the pattern that is organized in an individual's mind. Decision making is not obvious, as options are not analyzed consciously. The second approach is described as a formal process that is conscious and sequential and involves analysis before reaching a decision (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993) . In this mode, the optimum decision is chosen based on the available information. However, due to the bounded rationality of humans, sometimes in this method people opt towards satisficing (Simon, 1955) , rather than optimizing decision. In this paper we refer to these as Type 1 and Type 2 forms of thinking. The key issue within the Type 1 and Type 2 debate relates to the relationship between the two modes of thinking in decision making.
This has received interest from the IB community. Choo (2009) used the cognitive continuum theory proposed by Hammond (1996) in which intuitive and analytical cognitive styles are described in the context of a continuum between opposite poles (Hammond, 2010) . Recent work in decision making has, however, suggested that, rather than being incompatible, Type 1 and Type 2 approaches may form complementary dualisms. Allen (2011) , drawing on dualprocessing theory, proposed five different modes of information seeking: intuitive, intuition-led supported by deliberative information behavior, deliberative information behavior moderated by intuition, truncated deliberate information seeking, parallel (intuition and deliberate working together).
Although this body of research indicates that context influences decision mode and corresponding information behavior, there is also a tradition of research that suggests that individual differences play a significant role in the decision mode used by decision makers irrespective of context. One aspect of difference that is particularly seen as influencing behavior is expertise.
Expertise, Information, and Decision Making
The role of expertise in influencing how decision making is undertaken has been widely studied, particularly in the context of NDM. Greitzer, Podmore, Robinson, and Ey (2010, p. 280) state that in broad terms highly experienced people process information at the subconscious level and do not need to "interpret and integrate cues or consider possible alternate actions," whereas moderately experienced people need to process the information and use a rule-based approach (if-then). They suggest that this not only more accurately describes decision-making processes, but, importantly, also provides a more effective basis for support of decision making. Establishing what characterizes "an expert," how an expert functions, and how experts and nonexperts differ in their decision making is all part of the training challenge faced by many organizations. One way to approach expert/nonexpert differences is to understand cognitive skill development, and studies in this area have investigated factors such as differences in information representation (Hutton & Klein, 1999) ; attention to relevant information (Randel et al., 1996) ; chunking-the ability to condense information into meaningful chunks (Means et al., 1993) ; use of pattern matching (Klein, 1998) ; and the mental organization of domain knowledge (Glaser, 1987) .
The role of intuition in expertise-based decisions has also been studied (e.g., Salas et al., 2010 )-both its function and its development-as have broader issues relating to problem solving method and cognitive strategy (Elliott, 2005) . Also explored are links between expertise and confidence. For example, Shanteau (1988) found that top decision makers in a number of sectors share psychological characteristics such as perceptiveness, communication skills, self-confidence, and creativity under stress. Especially in areas where decision making is time pressured, subject to uncertainty, complex, and involves potentially serious consequences, to understand and respond to the interaction between expertise, decision-making style, and information behavior is clearly important.
Overall, a number of facets of expertise appear to be common across domains, but in general understanding is as yet far from complete and deeper knowledge at the cognitive level holds the potential to allow more effective interface design and information provision appropriate to the particular individual decision maker and the decisional context.
Analyzing previous experience can lead to isomorphism. According to Kirkwood (1999, p. 34) , "if circumstances are duplicated, the consequences will be the same." Thus, for an experienced decision maker, if the situation resembles a past situation, the actions or decisions to be made will be dependent on past experience. The NDM approach argues experience helps decision makers to make a decision, as it acts as a source of information (e.g., Klein, 1998) by recognizing patterns to fill information gaps. Saracevic, Zhang, and Kusunoki (2012) also suggested that by enabling comparison with past similar cases, information technology can facilitate decision making during fast-paced medical events. Finkelstein, Whitehead, and Campbell (2008) , however, warned that people "are at risk of making poor decisions when they have enough experience to believe" [that they are right] (p. 27). Weick (1993, p. 639) , too, indicated that under time pressure, people "regress to their most habituated ways of responding," indicating that people rely more on their past experience. In the Tenerife air disaster, Weick (1990) delineated how past experience of an aircraft pilot led to an assumption that resulted in a catastrophe. Court (1997) , in his research on engineers developing new products, showed that products were not developed considering the new information available but were based on information gained from experience, indicating that experienced people may not use new information or give it sufficient weight. Radecki and Jaccard (1995, p. 107) added further that when people feel they are more knowledgeable, they do not search for information systematically and "may be more likely to use simplistic decision rules." It seems that although expertise is a key influence on decision making and fundamentally affects information seeking and use, there are many as yet not fully integrated lines of investigation and its influence on information behaviors remains opaque.
Information Use and Uncertainty
A third important but underresearched area is the relationship between information use and uncertainty. Information behavior research tends to be dominated by inquiry into information needs and seeking and less attention has been given to information use (Kari, 2007; O'Farrill, 2008; Wilson, 1997) . Information use is identified to be an action that takes place after the search for information has taken place, or information is acquired or received.
In information behavior research uncertainty has been a focus of research for a number of years (Belkin, 1980; Cole, 1993 , Kuhlthau, 1997 Wilson, 1999) . Belkin (1980) stated that people seek information after they realize their anomalous state of knowledge (ASK), thus emphasizing information seeking as a response to uncertainty. Similarly, Kuhlthau (1993) proposed the information search process (ISP) model to illustrate different stages of information seeking based on the level of uncertainty. However, how information is used in naturalistic settings to reduce uncertainty has not been extensively researched.
Uncertainty is often linked with task complexity (Daft, Sormunen, & Parks, 1988; Tiamiyu, 1992) . Alchian (1950, p. 212 ) stated that uncertainty arises from the "human inability to solve complex problems." Thus, if the task is complex then uncertainty is higher (Culnan, 1983; Vakkari, 1998) .
Uncertainty is also associated with the type of source accessed. For example, Sawyerr (1993) , in an investigation of perception of environmental uncertainty and environmental scanning behavior (of information), identified that with greater environmental uncertainty there was an increase in frequency of scanning, that is, increase in information seeking. Daft and Lengel (1986) argued that with a high level of perceived strategic uncertainty, the use of personal (as opposed to impersonal) and external (as opposed to internal) sources of information is high. Thus, different types of source, and competency in using these sources, can have different impacts on the reduction of uncertainty. However, experience can also be a source of information that has not been considered extensively, with few exceptions (Allen, 2011) .
One of the most influential models of information use and uncertainty is Wilson (1999) Wilson categorized problem solving into different stages such as problem identification (identifying the type of problem), problem definition (finding the nature of the problem), problem resolution (determining how to find the answer to the problem), and a solution statement (presenting an answer to the problem). He further argued that uncertainty can be present until the final stage but decreases at each stage (Wilson, 1999) . This type of problem-solving model is mostly a rational (Type 2) style of decision making (Allen, 2011; Savolainen, 2006) and is similar to the lobster pot decision-making model (Figure 2 ), where after each step options are narrowed down and hence uncertainty is reduced and, once the final option is chosen, the task is completed.
Thus, uncertainty reduction is often considered the rational model in information behavior research, the rationale for information seeking and use. However, as illustrated by the work of Fu and Sim (2011) , uncertainty in information quality and uncertainty due to information overload are also not without relevance. A wide and growing range of behavioral research has established that, in reality, much decision making in circumstances where the complexity of the situation exposes man as a "limited capacity information processor" (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972 ) falls back on heuristic procedures and/or perceptions of previous choices (Fu & Sim, 2011, p. 20) .
An interesting question, therefore, is whether it is correct to see uncertainty and the resolution of uncertainty as prime motivators for information seeking and use of information? Even if it is, in many of the application contexts on which the current research focuses, how the acquired information will be used may not necessarily be consistent with rational, Type 2 modes of decision making. If that is the case, then a further question is whether the ways information is provided to support such decisions should acknowledge that and information provision tailored so that it is better suited to Type 1 modes of decision making.
In conclusion, in each of the three areas outlined in this literature review, we identified that there is a need for further research and developed the following research questions to address this need: Are decision modes which don't conform to traditional IB approaches used? Does expertise moderate information seeking and decision making? Is information sought and used primarily to resolve uncertainty? In the following section, we outline the method used to explore these questions.
Method
The context selected for this project was the information behavior of Category One Emergency Services personnel involved in decision making in response to major manmade or natural incidents (from a terrorist attack through to flooding) in the United Kingdom. Category One responders are the "blue light" services (police forces, fire and rescue services, and ambulance services), along with local authority and environment agencies. In the United Kingdom, incident commanders were, at the time of the fieldwork for this research, classified into a hierarchy of gold, silver, and bronze, depending on the role that they play. Gold commanders take a strategic role and often manage from a location remote from the incident and liaise with a number of Silver commanders. Silver commanders manage from the periphery of the incident overseeing a number of Bronze commanders. Bronze commanders work at the incident site managing a crew of personnel from a particular emergency service. Silver commanders, who are the coordinators at the incident, were selected for the study, as they need to make numerous tactical decisions in complex, uncertain, dynamic, and time-constrained environments (Comfort, Sungu, Johnson, & Dunn, 2001) .
The research was further narrowed to focus on the response phase. Emergency management is categorized by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) into four different phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. In the response phase, immediate assistance is provided and efforts are made to minimize the hazards created by the disaster in terms of management of evacuation, emergency relief, and search and rescue. This was selected as the most critical, complex, dynamic, and transparent phase in which emergency decisions have to be made (Comfort et al., 2001; Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2008) .
The initial sample consisted of eight individuals with significant experience of managing major incidents as Silver commanders. A further 12 interviewees were contacted by a snowballing process. Of the 20 face-to-face interviews that were conducted, nine participants had more than 30 years of experience, seven participants had 20 to 30 years of experience, three participants' experience ranged from 12 to 18 years, and one participant had 5 years of experience. Interviewees were from different geographical regions, ranging from Northern to Southern England including Northern Ireland and Scotland. Interviews were undertaken mostly at the workplace of the interviewees. However, in some cases, for the convenience of both researcher and interviewee, it was done at a training center or army headquarters where exercises were taking place. The interviews ranged from a minimum of 40 minutes duration to a maximum 99 minutes, averaging 70 minutes. During the interviews, handwritten notes were taken in addition to audiorecording, as this provides "detailed insight into the performance of both the respondent and the interviewer" (Barriball & While, 1994, p. 332 (Adair, 2007) . [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Interviews were undertaken using the critical incident technique (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954) , which has been used in both information science (Sonnenwald & Pierce, 2000; Urquhart et al., 2003) and decision making (Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989) .
In addition to the interviews, more insight about the way in which Silver commanders engage themselves, at the multiagency level, was gathered through observation of exercises. Due to the sensitivity and the risk involved, observation of real-time emergency management was not possible. However, fortunately, it was possible to observe joint training and exercises of the multiagency emergency services (police, fire, ambulance, local authority, and utility services, army). Three full-day tactical level training exercises one full-day table top exercise, and three half-day joint exercises were observed. During observation, notes were taken and when permission was granted, audio and video recording was also undertaken.
To maintain confidentiality, transcripts were anonymized. A list was made in Excel in which place name was replaced by Area1, Area2, and so on. Similarly, based on the number of the interview, interviewees' initials were replaced by identification number, I1, 1 I2 . . . I20. In total, 346 (A4) pages of transcripts from 20 interviews were analyzed.
The collected information was coded using qualitative data analysis techniques employing an inductive framework. Open coding was done by reading word-by-word from the transcript and using the constant comparative method suggested by Strauss (1987) . Whenever possible, categories were grouped using in vivo coding (code names derived from the interviewees' language) to reflect the language used in practice. Once the open coding was done, depending on the relationship found between different categories, axial coding (connection between categories) was done, which aided in finding the major themes (Strauss, 1987) .
Within this research project, activity theory was used as the overarching framework for understanding and exploring information management (Chen, Sharman, Chakravarti, Rao, & Upadhyaya, 2008; Kutti, 1999; Lim & Hang, 2003; Wilson, 2006) . It was also used to study information behavior in similar environments (Allen, 2011; Allen, Karanasios, & Slavova, 2011; Chen et al., 2008; Henggeler Antunes, Almeida, Lopes, & Clímaco, 1994) and is particularly helpful in situations where one needs to make sense of actions in terms of their impact on the activity, on participants, and on their developmental potential (Engeström, 2000) .
Activity theory "considers human behavior in terms of activity systems that is goal-directed" (Artemeva & Freedman, 2001, p. 167) . Its origin can be traced to the work of a group of Soviet psychologists initiated by Vygotsky in the 1920s and 1930s (Artemeva & Freedman, 2001; Engeström, 2001) .
Activities are object oriented and are triply mediated (Spasser, 2002, p. 93) , as they are:
• Mediated by tools or artifacts, which provide the subject "with the experience historically collected by his/her community" (Chen et al., 2008, p. 207) . In an activity system, mediating artifacts may be internal such as signs or language, or external physical tools.
• Mediated by rules and regulations.
• Mediated by interpersonal relationships, roles (division of labor).
In activity theory, the unit of analysis is an activity that can be further divided into actions and operations, leading to a three-level model as shown in Figure 3 . The first layer is an activity driven by an object-related motive. The second layer is an individual or group action driven by a conscious goal. An activity can be composed of one or several actions. The third layer is operations, a routine process driven by conditions. When there is a change in the condition, operations can become an action. Thus there is a bidirectional relationship between these levels.
Activities were analyzed on a temporal basis using the following generic chronology: After being notified of the incident, the Silver commander reaches the incident ground (the location where the incident has occurred) where the major task is to command, control, and coordinate. Thus, the following stages were identified: being activated; en route to the incident ground; command, control, and coordinate; and Silver meetings. Within each of the stages the Silver commander (the subject of the system) acts on the management of the incident (the object of the system) by performing a number of actions. The actions of interest for this research also remain constant: dynamic risk assessment and creation of situational awareness.
As the incident progresses, however, other elements of the activity system change. When, for example, the commander moves from being en route in a car to working in a command and control center the IT systems available (the tools) and the way in which work is allocated and divided within the team (the division of labor) alters.
Working within this analytical framework, data were collected using semistructured interviews. While coding, categories were also created based on the components of activity systems (such as rules, tools, division of labor). Contradictions, an essential part of an activity system, were investigated and coded. To complement the data collection and for triangulation, government and practitioners' reports and other documents available online were also studied. (Leontiev, 1981) .
Findings and Discussion
In the following section, findings from the research are presented and discussed in relation to the three issues of types of decision making, the resolution of uncertainty, and the moderating influence of expertise.
Modes of Decision Making
During the research it became clear that crew commanders perceived a need to engage in Type 2 decision making and in many circumstances made decisions based on a deliberative, analytical, and conscious processes. They described an information-rich process that required reflection. One respondent, for example, recognized this and stated:
I'll like to try and think, I think that I look at alternatives, everybody wants a snap decision but I want time, I don't want to shoot from the hip, I want time to think.
Nonetheless, it was clear that although commanders engaged in Type 2 approaches, they often moderated this process by also using Type 1 decision making:
There is a lot of information that you can't actually verify for yourself but going through a series of questions, you can actually drill it down, then I suppose you get it down to a judgment call. And, you will never find the situation where it is 100% correct or 100% wrong, there will be position between that based upon-your knowledge, your experience, your feelings for this type of incident, you will make decision one way or other.
The excerpt presented below also suggests that even when information is not sufficient to build situation awareness, people can use their experience to fill the gap. An experienced decision maker may often "know" how the incident will transpire, subsequently enabling swifter decision making.
[I]f you are too experienced, you can try to fill the gaps with I know what is going to happen here-you know in your thinking. This is the way it is going to turn out. And I have spent years in trying to find that myself about, I know how they are going to play it or this is what this is going to do. . . . I have been here before therefore this is what will happen. I had been through this before-this is easy.
This type of decision making, which emerges through recognition of a pattern, is intuitive and develops due to the regularity of operating in a particular environment (Kahneman & Klein, 2009 ) and experience. Thompson et al. (2004) showed in their research that information seeking is generally associated with inexperienced people rather than experts. This also suggests that expert decision makers may not always seek out information, as pattern recognition fills the information gaps (Finkelstein et al., 2008) . Thus, experience is found to be an influential factor that affects the decision-making mode.
The use of an approach that blended Type 1 and Type 2 was explicitly linked by respondents to lack of time to engage Type 2 decision making. One respondent noted:
. . . there is a lot of pressure on you to make decisions sometimes and they have to be made quickly and sometimes you are going to make wrong decisions but I do think that people will act first and think afterwards, sometimes.
Time sensitivity added to the complexity of the situation and was identified by a number of respondents as a reason why they engaged in Type 1 approaches.
A man and a girl kidnapped, taken to a hotel room. It was necessary to raid all the rooms that was checked in around the same time as those kidnappers but then public prestige . . . so decision was made . . . in 3 seconds.
Others noted the high value/impact of the decision context allied to time sensitivity as a key factor driving mode one approaches:
I do think that people will act first and think afterwards, sometimes. It's difficult to say because it depends on what situation, doesn't it. Sometimes you have to make decisions good or bad. You know, a car is burning, someone has broken their leg, really we shouldn't be dragging them out but if we don't drag them out they are going to die, you know. So they are dragged out, it's like the easy thing-afterwards thinking.
In this context, it was argued that it is better to make any decision rather than no decision at all.
Generally I say that the decision is 80% right. It is better than no decision. So sometime, it comes down to gut instinct and say that my experience says this is the right thing to do in this situation. I think it depends on the nature of decisions that needs to be taken.
However, as time sensitivity and complexity increased they noted that they would be more likely to engage in Type 1 approaches:
In a big bang situation like the "Name" train crash, you make decisions all the time and it is very difficult to one to go through the normal rationale of the decision making process and then log your decisions because you are making so many decisions immediately on the hoof.
This statement below suggests Silver commanders, with regular practice and experience, may have integrated the rules into their behavior. Although people are often making analytical decisions nondeliberatively, they may be using the heuristics that come with experience (Evans, 2011) . Evans (2011, p. 89) further stated that Type 2 thinking can also be faster as "with experience people may develop useful heuristics which are quick and simple to process." . . . you come with all these ideas, you refine them and come with 2 out of 5 and-you say that it could be time consuming process, but it's not, that can happen very quickly.
From the description above, it can be concluded that the combination of Type 1 and Type 2 decision making may be used in complex, uncertain, dynamic, and time-constrained environments. Silver commanders are encouraged to use Type 2 decision making, however, in practice they do knowingly engage in Type 1 decision making. The findings also suggest that although Silver commanders may have some discretionary time available, they are inclined towards the combination of Type 1 and Type 2 decision making, as Evans (above) stated. In the information science literature, information seeking is often seen as an analytical and conscious activity in which, once the user identifies the need for information, they start searching for and selecting it based on relevance (Savolainen, 2006) . Allen (2011) , however, has argued that people may not always analyze options and may follow different modes of decision making. Consistent with Allen's research (2011) , in this research it was found that in complex, uncertain, dynamic, and timeconstrained situations, while making decisions, decision makers may not seek information and may rely on their experience and inherited mental models.
The Moderating Influence of Expertise
The role of expertise in moderating decision behavior, both directly and indirectly through factors such as confidence, is complex and only partly understood. Although contrasting views are identified in the literature on expert decision making, several researchers (Court, 1997; Rennie & Gibbins, 1993; Ullman, 1992) suggest that experts make better decisions and this is more pronounced in time critical and complex situations (Klein, 1998) . This finding also indicates that people rely on their past experience, and base their present decisions on the knowledge gained from past experience that helps in complex, uncertain, dynamic, and timeconstrained environments.
The findings of the study reported here add something to the relevant body of knowledge. In this research, use of Type 1 modes of thinking was found to be closely associated with experience. Respondents noted the link between experience gained by training and Type 1 decision making:
. . . because in those first 10 minutes, you know what you need to do, you are so rehearsed at it.
Relatedly, pattern recognition was also found to be used in making decisions by Silver commanders. If Silver commanders are experienced then they might try to match the task to previous tasks and then opt for a similar type of decision.
What's happening is because of your experience you are bypassing the formal process but it is running subconsciously behind everything else. So, you know, it's got what your legislation says, what are your options, you know, through that cycle, you are aware of what legislation says or you are seeking advice on it. . . . It's a subprogram that is running behind your decision making, you are actually doing that without consciously ticking the boxes and saying does that, does that, does that because actually you are running those things behind.
It was clear that experienced commanders were more likely to use Type 1 approaches to decision making and to make less use of information before a decision was made. A further influential factor on the decision-making approach adopted appeared to be the confidence of the decision maker. The data indicated that higher levels of expertise in certain circumstances leads to greater confidence, which in turn encourages Type 1 decision making. However, in some circumstances it seems that even a generally expert decision maker may not feel particularly confident, perhaps because of the exact type of the decision or because of specific contextual factors. In such cases, it appears more likely that a more analytically based, Type 2 approach will be adopted. Deeper understanding of this question and the information behavior and need questions that flow from it would be particularly valuable.
Experienced decision makers, however, may change the course of a decision, depending on the demands of the situation. This may be possible for such decision makers as they use their own experience as a source of information (Choo, 2009) , which may help them in deciding their next course of action. Thompson et al. (2004) also stated that decision making becomes quicker for experienced people. That said, these decision makers may not use the information in the same way as is implied in the theory that advocates analyzing options before coming to a decision. An illustration is provided below for further understanding.
I was able to recognize that one of the key processes that would follow would be a casualty bureau . . . and I quickly recognized that the area I worked was going to be a major. . . . So I made that executive decision to actually stand back.
In this excerpt, the respondent is able to relate the pattern to something that had happened before that helped him/her to decide on the next course of action. This finding is in line with Richter et al. (2009) , who stated that when people have sufficient knowledge and experience, they are able to reject false information faster and more effectively.
It was also found that during emergency management, if a Silver commander is under time pressure, information seeking is limited. Decisions are made by recognizing a pattern. Richter et al. (2009, p. 538 ) stated that knowledge (from experience) based validation of information is possible: "even when the subject is put under load (such as time pressure)."
It was identified in the literature that in the absence of rules, and when the situation is complex, uncertain, dynamic, and time constrained, Type 1 decision making is used by expert decision makers (Richter et al., 2009; Thompson et al., 2004) . However, due to the criticality of the situation and the public high-risk, analytical decision making is recommended by researchers in emergency management (Crichton & Flin, 2002) . Fitzgerald and Galloway (2001) supported this view stating that automatic decision making can lead to errors. Bennett (1999) in a similar way stated that experience might create obstacles in practice or may lead to acceptance of false information (Richter et al., 2009 ). In the excerpt below, the respondent suggests that commanders, although they may know all the options, may feel the need to explore further. There may be situations where information is available but may not be considered by decision makers, as in the example below, where, although the person was deceased, it was not realized and people were not able to explore further options by considering this (in principle) available information.
You are pretty much aware of your options although I have to say sometimes it is nicer to explore those options a bit further. You know you are aware of the situation . . . the guy was actually dead on arrival at the hospital but nobody knew he was dead at the hospital. They had not followed that up. So we had this information out there that was available but wasn't being followed up.
However, as Finkelstein et al. (2008) stated, even new information may not help decision makers as they decide unconsciously under time pressure. The findings of the present research, in a similar way, suggest that although decision makers may have different ways to get information, such as advisors, if they are experienced and familiar with similar situations they may not seek further information or advice from others.
Thus, overall, several views emerge from the findings and from the literature. There may always be an element of experience and pattern recognition when decisions are to be made by experts in complex, uncertain, dynamic, and timeconstrained environments, but there are many unanswered questions of detail about the interaction of expertise, information, and decision making.
Resolution of Uncertainty
The reported research indicates that information was not used solely to resolve uncertainty but was also to provide post-hoc justification. Interestingly, Silver commanders explicitly indicated that information seeking occurred after the decision had been made:
You will make an intuitive decision and then in retrospect you will justify that decision . . . because I think it's hard to actually show the input and thought process followed by decision. It is easy to make the decision and then show the reasons for it.
The use of post-hoc information seeking was linked to the difficulty found in articulating why they had made a decision and the need to justify the decision post-hoc to others and to gain self-understanding after a process of analysis: Silver commanders spoke of the post-hoc justification of decision making while being aware that it contravened preferred organizational procedures and policy. One respondent noted:
If you have got to act quickly then people do take chances . . . sure, they will say that they made a dynamic risk assessment. They will say that everything was good and you know that there is an element, it's not lying is it-it is justifying, justifying decisions that have already been made. This approach resonates with Allen's (2011) finding that intuition can often lead decision making but is supported by deliberative information behavior. In this case, however, the deliberative information behavior seems to have been undertaken primarily to legitimize the prior decision rather than to resolve uncertainty.
Post-Decision-Making Information Seeking: Revisiting Wilson's Uncertainty Model
This form of information seeking after decision making has not been explored in depth within IB research and suggests the need to extend Wilson's (1999) model of problem solving, which assumes that the information-seeking process stops after the decision is made and information is sought primarily to resolve uncertainty.
In his problem-solving model ( Figure 1 ) Wilson (1999, p. 841) stated that with each passing stage, "the individual moves from uncertainty to increasing certainty." Although the first and the second stage of the problem-solving model may be seen in expert problem solving, the research findings suggest that in the third stage of problem resolution, irrespective of time pressure and complexity, experts may not consider how to find the answer to a problem but would act immediately. The problem is often resolved subconsciously without the expert (Silver commander) being consciously aware of the process and therefore finding it difficult to articulate. Furthermore, Wilson's proposal that with each stage uncertainty is resolved may not always happen as suggested by this respondent: In this statement, the respondent made a decision to ask for a number of hotel rooms to be raided (and falls under solution statement of Wilson's problem solving model), however, as further added ". . . I hope that was right-a right decision." This shows that even though a decision (solution) was made, uncertainty had not been fully resolved. In such scenarios, Wilson (1999, p. 841) added, ". . . if uncertainty fails to be resolved at any one stage, it may result in a feedback loop." However, Silver commanders need to work under time pressure; in such scenarios, there may not be enough time for considering the implications of the feedback loop and trying to resolve the same problem again. Moreover, the findings suggest people may seek information even after the problem is solved and use the information after the decision has been made for post-hoc justification and learning, as indicated in the excerpt below . . . absolutely yes, you will make an intuitive decision and then in retrospect you will justify that decision and funny enough I think the decision logs encourage that.
Similar to this research finding, Chowdhury, Gibb, and Landoni (2011) stated that uncertainty does not decrease or cease by the end of the task, as was stated by earlier researchers (Michael & Blake, 2007; Wilson, 1999) . A need to modify the problem-solving model for experts in timeconstrained environments in terms of information seeking is evident.
In Wilson's (1999) model, with the solution statement, the information-seeking process stops. However, in this research the findings indicate that even after the problem is resolved, information seeking takes place when justification needs to be provided. Thus, to accommodate information seeking after the problem is solved (decision made), Wilson's (1999) model can be extended as shown in Figure 4 .
Literature on post-decision-making information seeking can be identified in decision making (Shani & Zeelenberg, 2007) and in marketing research (Perkins & Rao, 1990) ; however, it is underexplored in information science research. Choo (2008) merely stated that decision makers may choose a "justificationist" approach. Similarly, Ellis et al. (2002) touched on the topic by stating that retrospective information search may take place. This concept of "post-decision-making information seeking" is an important phenomenon (Huber & Seiser, 2001; Jonas, TrautMattausch, Frey, & Greenberg, 2008; Shani & Zeelenberg, 2007) in information practices and merits further exploration.
While information seeking may occur post-hoc to verify decisions, as suggested by Shani and Zeelenberg (2007) , our reading of the results suggests that information seeking and use are motivated by a need to provide post-hoc justification either in addition to verification or instead of verification. They may also support learning. If undertaken for verification, research indicates that information search for supporting decisions already made will be biased (Jonas et al., 2008) . Respondents were acutely aware of this risk of bias:
The reality is that, you would probably act, take the decision and then report your rationale. But of course you are recording your rationale to fit the choice that you took. You know, that's always the danger that you're just making fit. But that decision tends to come from the fact that you got to the point that decision has to be taken and there is no other way of taking information or some of the information that can make it better.
Other research in post-decision information seeking reveals that people seek information to confirm decisions made (Frey, 1981; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001 ). As Jonas et al. (2008 Jonas et al. ( , p. 1180 highlighted "people show a preference for supporting rather than conflicting information." This, according to Frey (1981) , is especially true when decision makers need to defend their decisions publicly rather than to themselves. To this, Huber and Seiser (2001) added that justification pressure leads to information seeking in support of decisions made. In the case of Silver commanders, it needs to be available for the debriefing after the incident. During the debriefing process, the log book which they write to explain their actions and decisionmaking processes is scrutinized. They may then have to defend their decisions in a public enquiry or court case. It was found that Silver commanders may make decisions intuitively and then, for the ease of justification during the debriefing process, they might seek for information.
Conclusion
In this paper we explored information behavior in a complex, uncertain, dynamic, and time-constrained environment. Three research questions were identified: Are decision modes that don't conform to traditional IB approaches used? FIG. 4 . Expert problem solving model: an extension to Wilson's (1999) model. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.] Does expertise moderate information seeking and decision making? Is information sought and used primarily to resolve uncertainty?
We find that both the context of the activity and individual differences influence choice of decision mode and associated information behavior. The modes of thinking observed did not conform to the models used within IB research. We established that commanders engage in modes of decision making that incorporate a Type 1 mode of thinking and that time sensitivity plays a key role in establishing which mode is used. Expertise was revealed as moderating the use of the Type 1 mode of thinking, with expert decision makers being more likely to use Type 1 mode. We also established that in this context information is often not used to resolve uncertainty in decision making, and indeed information is often sought and used after the decision is made to justify the decision. These findings provide further evidence for post-hoc information behavior using empirical data from a naturalistic setting.
The findings from this research add to our understanding of Silver commanders' decision-making processes and information behavior. This should enable us to develop and improve systems and work practices to support their decision making. More significantly, by investigating information behaviors within a different context (far removed from that of students, scholars, and professionals) the work has provided novel findings which develop existing models and our understanding of information use and seeking. It is clear that the context investigated in this study is unusual in the extent to which the high degree to which dynamism, complexity, uncertainty, and time pressure are manifested. Further research is needed to explore these issues in other work environments.
